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Book Reviews
TnE LAW OF AWOL. By Alfred Avins. New York: Oceana Publications
1957. Pp. xxi, 288. $4.95.
For more than half a century, military law in the United States
was identified with a single text, Winthrop's MILITARY LAW AND
PBECEDENTS.' While other treatises existed, none approached its
stature as a classic. Since enactment of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice in 1950, there have been a number of newer books,2 but only
time will tell whether any will achieve the reputation of Winthrop.
We are now witnessing a further development, the appearance of the
specialized monograph on a single topic within the broader area of
military justice. In this category falls the book under review: a de-
tailed treatment of the law of absence without leave, the most com-
mon of all military offenses. 3
When I first approached Mr. Avins' book, I was skeptical that
a single military offense, even one of every day occurrence, warranted
a book to itself. But since the author, now assistant instructor in law
at Rutgers, had already made a mark for himself by a most interesting
study of judicial review of state court martial proceedings, 4 a paper
which won honorable mention in a competition sponsored by the In-
stitute of Military Law, I tempered my skepticism with hope. Having
read Mr. Avins' book, I am willing to concede that there is room for a
treatise on absence without leave, but I am afraid that the author
has not given us the book which we might have hoped for from him.
But first for the book's undoubted merits. To begin with, it is
certainly comprehensive. The author must have done a tremendous
1 Winthrop, Military Law (1886); Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents
-(2 ed. 1896).
2 E.g., Snedeker, Military justice Under the Uniform Code (1953); Aycock
and Wurfel, Military Law Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (1955).
Wiener, The Uniform Code of Military Justice (1950) is a section-by-section
analysis of the 1950 Code and a comparison thereof with the 1948 Articles of War.
Military Jurisprudence (Lawyers Co-op 1951), Schiller, Military Law (1952), and
Walker, Military Law (1954) are essentially collections of cases and materials.
Philos, Handbook of Court-Martial Law (Rev. ed. 1951) is primarily a digest.
For pungent comments on some of these, see Wiener, The Teaching of Mili-
tary Law in a University Law School, 5 J. Legal Ed. 475 (1953).
3 Accounting, along with desertion, for about 50% of all general court-martial
cases, and perhaps over 90% of all court-martial cases, general, special and sum-
mary. See statistics given at p. 34 of Mr. Avins' book.
Comment, State Court Review of National Guard Courts-Martial and Mili-
tary Board Decisions, 41 Comell L.Q. 457 (1956).
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amount of research. His citations range in time from 13275 to the
present day, in space from the Straits Settlements6 around the world
and back again to the South Pacific Theater of Operations during
World War II. He discusses every aspect of absence without leave,
detailing the elements which must be proved to establish the prosecu-
tion's case, and discussing every conceivable defense which might be
raised on behalf of the accused.
For the most part, the author accepts the conclusions reached by
prior experts in the field, by the Court of Military Appeals, by the
service Boards of Review and by various civil courts. (It is surprising
how often problems of military law have managed to come before the
civil courts, despite the supposed immunity of court martial judgments
from civilian judicial review). But where appropriate, Mr. Avins does
not hesitate to express his disagreement with prior rulings. While I do
not propose to go into all of these, or state to what extent I agree or
disagree, one or two illustrations may be of interest.
Mr. Avins makes an impressive case against the rule that an
accused is considered absent without leave during any period of
detention by the civil authorities charged with a crime.8 The only
exception recognized is the case where the accused is on leave at the
time of his arrest and the civil proceedings result in his acquittal. So
far has the rule been carried that the Navy Judge Advocate General
has taken the position that even a dismissal of the charges by the civil
authorities is not enough to exonerate the accused: nothing short of a
full-fledged acquittal will suffice. 9 Mr. Avins challenges the rule,
arguing that since the accused is prevented by force from returning
to military control, he should have available the defense of impossi-
bility, provided that he has taken steps to notify the military authori-
ties of his whereabouts. He claims that the early court martial rulings
which passed upon the question did in fact take this position.'0 The
present rule seems to have been imported into the court martial area
5 P. 173, citing De Chressey's Case, Y.B. Mich. 1 Edw. 8, f. 25, pl. 24, Jenkin's
Reports 7, 145 Eng. Rep. 6 (Ex. 1327) (Although it does not seem to me that
this ancient case supports the defense of "relative impossibility," for which Mr.
Avins apparently cites it, but rather holds precisely the opposite).6 Pp. 52, 104, 216.
7 P. 202.
s Pp. 150-62. See Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, par. 165,
p. 316; Snedeker, Military Justice Under the Uniform Code, p. 563, sec. 2802 f(1953). A very recent holding affirming the currently accepted rule, and applying
it to one adjudged a "youthful offender" in juvenile proceedings, is United States
v. Myrhe, 9 U.S.C.M.A., 32, 25 C.M.R. 294 (1958).
9 CMO 12-1930, p. 15, discussed at pp. 156-57 of Mr. Avins' book.
10 Pp. 150-51. The authorities cited, however, are not very convincing, ex-
cept by negative implication.
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from cases involving civil suits for back payi where perhaps it has
some justification.
Mr. Avins also takes up arms against the rule that an absence
without leave cannot be constructively condoned, condonation being
recognized as a defense only to a charge of desertion.12 He argues
that this rule is based upon a misreading of the precedents. At the
time the early cases involving constructive condonation were decided, 13
no distinction was drawn administratively between desertion and ab-
sence without leave. As a result, all condonations were administra-
tively recorded as condonations of desertion, even though in many
such cases, if there had been a trial, the actual court-martial offense
would have amounted only to absence without leave. He concludes
that historically there is no doubt that constructive condonation was
available as a defense to a charge of absence without leave and that
the present rule confining it to desertion cases cannot be supported.14
Mr. Avins does not hesitate to cross swords even with Winthrop,
stating at one point that, in so far as Winthrop "is to the contrary"
(i.e. of the proposition that to a charge of disobedience one may have
the defense of mistake of authority), he is "not correct."1 A careful
reading of the passage cited shows no real inconsistency, but only a
more temperate and guarded statement by Winthrop that "a certain
discretion in the execution of an order may sometimes be permitted
to officers high in rank or command, or officers charged with expert
or peculiarly responsible duties," a principle which Mr. Avins would
convert into the rather sweeping defense of "mistake of fact on the
part of authority."16 At another point Mr. Avins says that Winthrop's
comment on a Maine militia case involving an allegedly unreasonable
11 Dodge v. United States, 33 Ct. Cl. 28 (1897).1 2 Pp. 268-76. See Aycock and Wurfel, Military Law Under the Uniform
Code of Military justice 142 (1955). In United States v. Minor 1 U.S.C.M.A.
497, 4 C.M.R. 89 (1952), the Court of Military Appeals was asked to extend the
defense to absence without leave, but decided the case on other grounds, reserving
the question for "further consideration x x x in an appropriate setting." Mr. Avins
discusses this case at p. 271, but says that it "appears erroneous," probably re-
ferring to the Court's expression of doubt whether it could broaden the rule "with-
out legislative sanction."
13P. 270. Mr. Avins cites Winthrop, Digest of Opinions of the Judge Ad-
vocates General of the Army, 1862-1895, p. 140, No. 2 (1895), and Davis,
Military Law 403 (2d ed. 1909), among other authorities to the effect that con-
structive condonation is available as a defense to a charge of absence without
leave. He also cites Howland, Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates General
of the Army (1912) p. 16, par. II B 7, digesting an 1863 case to the same effect.
14 Pp. 270-71.
'5 P. 191, citing Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 572 (1920 reprint




order is "misleading and inadequate."l't There does not, however, ap-
pear to be any real difference between the author and Winthrop on the
substantive point involved.
On the other hand, Mr. Avins accepts with equanimity some
results which strike this reviewer as little more than logic chopping.
In one case an accused who was absent without leave was arrested
by German customs officials. Thinking that they had power to arrest
him, he went with them. The Board of Review held that he was not
guilty of an absence terminated by apprehension but only of the
lesser offence of absence terminated by surrender, since in fact the
arrest by the German authorities was unauthorized and the accused
was presumed to know the law!l' s As Mr. Avins says, this is one situa-
tion where the maxim that everyone is presumed to know the law
benefited rather than hurt the accused. 19
Even as forbidding a subject as military law has its lighter aspects.
In recounting a case holding that it was no defense to an unauthorized
absence for the accused to claim that his food disagreed with him,2 0
the author adds the observation, reminiscent perhaps of a certain
well-known old soldier: "If every person left his unit who was not
fond of the food that was served, armies would soon fade away."2 1
In 1864 a Union commander, apparently of Copperhead sym-
pathies, promised his soldiers leave on condition that they vote
against President Lincoln.2 2 It is not surprising that this was ruled
an illegal condition to attach to a grant of leave. 23
In 1787 an English naval court-martial tried Mr. Jerrard, flrst lieu-
tenant of the Scipo, for disobedience of orders in that during the
absence of the captain and contrary to orders, he not only granted
leave but permitted women to come aboard. Although the court-
martial dismissed him from the ship, it recommended him strongly
to the Admiralty, partly because of his good service in the late war
and also because the members did not think that he had acted out of
a spirit of indiscipline but from kindness, adding that they could go
no further with decency in an official document.
24
17 P. 239, citing Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 576, n. 33 (1920
reprint of 2d ed. 1896), commenting on State v. Woodman, Smith's Maine Militia
Court Martial Decisions 25 (3d Military Cir. 1828).
18 P. 140, citing United States v. Mueller, 17 C.M.R. 431 (1954).
1) Ibid.
20 p. 146, citing United States v. McIntyre, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 559, 10 C.M.R. 57
(1953).
21 Ibid.
22 p. 245, citing Winthrop, Digest of Opinioins of the Judge Advocate General
of the Army, 1862-1868, p. 149, No. 11, Dec. 1864. (3d ed. 1868).
2-3 Ibid.
24p. 282, citing Hannay, Naval Courts Martial (1680-1816) 56-57 (1914).
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I come now to the less pleasant portion of this review, my criti-
cisms. They are threefold: as to coverage, format, and style. Mr.
Avins says that he has designed his book for "multi-purpose use," for
the law student, the practicing attorney, the law course in a military
service school, the military attorney, the ROTC student, and the non-
lawyer in the service called on to administer some phase of military
law. 25 I doubt whether any book, however excellent, could fill all
these needs. But I do not see how a book limited to substantive law
can possibly do so. The author sets forth in detail those matters
which must be alleged and proved by the prosecution, and those mat-
ters which may be raised by the defense. But nowhere does he tell
how this is done. Nowhere is there a copy of a charge sheet, a sample
charge and specification, or any other reference to procedure. A more
serious omission is the failure to discuss any of the problems of
evidence. The beginning of an absence without leave is most often
proved by offering a "duly authenticated extract copy of the morning
report," as an exception to the hearsay rule.20 But there are traps here,
as many a lieutenant has discovered to his sorrow after his carefully
tried special court-martial case has been "busted" on review because
of the introduction of an improper morning report. In fact this is the
legal problem, par excellence, which arises more often than any other
in absence without leave cases.27 Yet it is not mentioned by Mr. Avins.
The author says that "no special format" has been used, that in
some places the book resembles a casebook, in others a textbook, in
still others a law review article.28 But the book does have a format,
one which I find difficult and confusing. The text is repeatedly in-
terrupted by excerpts from, or summaries of, some case, ruling, or
text-book discussion. As a rule these are indicated only by a block-
letter caption and a citation running across the page. Usually there is
no introduction and often no explanation. At one place, I found it
2 5 Preface, p. v.26 Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, pars. 144b, 144d, 164a;
pp. 265, 268, 313; Aycock and Wurfel, Military Law Under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice 257 (1955); United States v. Masusock, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 32, 1 C.M.R.
32 (1951).2 7 See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 663, 23 C.M.R. 127 (1957);
United States v. Teal, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 404, 12 C.M.R. 160 (1953); United States
v. Smith, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 121, 6 C.M.R. 121 (1952); United States v. Parlier, 1
U.S.C.M.A. 433, 4 C.M.R. 25 (1952).
There has, however, been some relaxation in this area. It was formerly neces-
sary that the entry in the morning report be based upon the personal knowledge
of the officer making it. Manual for Courts-Martial, U.S. Army, 1928, par. 117 a,
p. 121. It suffices now that the officer making the entry was under a duty to do
so, and to ascertain the truth thereof. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1951, par. 144b, d, pp. 266, 267; United States v. Wilson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 3, 15
C.M.R. 3 (1954).
28 Preface, p. v.
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very difficult to tell where the excerpt ended and the text resumed.2 9
Sometimes one cannot be sure whether the material is a direct quota-
tion, a paraphrase, or a summary. It seems to me that this format, far
from combining the best features of text, casebook, and article, is a
throwback to earlier methods of legal writing which we have out-
grown: the ancient "abridgment," in which case material and textual
comment finally came to be inextricably interwoven and confused.30
Finally, as to style. I realize that this can be a subjective matter,
and that, like the gunner of the HoRNir in the case cited by Mr.
Avins,31 I may be "liable to be capricious at the full and change of the
moon." But I do not think so. To me, sentences like the following are
badly written:
Constructive communication, as a substitute for actual com-
munication, is sufficient in AWOL cases, since the duty neglected is
not so far greater in fault than failure to acquire the necessary knowl-
edge as to make it fortuitous to punish the one fault for the other
with the same penalty.32
In addition, the above case does not answer the question
of whom the order is to be palpably illegal to.33
Not being an expert in the higher logic, I cannot determine the
meaning of this:
Failure to establish either one of these factors fails to
establish constructive communication. 34
Unfortunately, such examples are by no means rare.
I am old-fashioned enough to deplore jargon. I was willing to
accept "AWOL" in the interest of saving space. But "AWOLism"
grated on my nerves and "AWOLee" shattered them.
Nor are these solecisms confined to the mother tongue. We lawyers
claim the privilege of mispronouncing Latin in our fashion, but none
of us holds himself exempt from the rules of grammar. Last night, in
Coldwin Smith Hall, I met the ghost of Professor Charles E. Bennett.
He shook his head sadly and avowed that his life's work had been in
20 p. 99-102.30 Among the best known abridgments were Fitzherbert (1516), Brooke
(1574), Rolle (circa 1640), Bacon (1736), and Viner (1741-56). See Plucknett,
A Concise History of the Common Law 273-76, 288-89 (5th ed. 1956); Winfield,
Abridgments of the Year Books, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 214 (1923); Holdsworth,
Charles Viner and the Abridgments of English Law, 39 Law Q. Rev. 17 (1923).
Jenkins' Eight Centuries of Reports (1661) follows the same pattern: an abstract
of a Year-Book case followed by comments of the editor, presented in such man-
ner that the reader cannot tell which is the original report and which is Jenkins.






vain, when I told him that in Myron Taylor Hall we had a book which
referred, not once, but 18 times, to the rule "de minimus."
A final protest to the publisher. I grow old, and my eyes are dim,
so that I cannot see. As I gaze upon the pages of this book I say:
"The words are Avins' words, but the print is the print of Oceana
Publications; I discern it not, because their hand is chary of large type."
Robert S. Pasley
Professor of Law
The Cornell Law School
Ithaca, New York
THE Biri OF RicGrs. By Learned Hand. Harv. Univ. Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass., Pp. 77, 1958. TE RiGHT OF THE PEOPLE. By William
0. Douglas. Doubleday & Co., Garden City, N.Y., Pp. 216, 1958.
Here are two excellent little books that must be read, and must be
read together-their significance, in conventional legalese, is joint and
not several. Here from two eminent members of the Federal Bench,
are the briefs on either side of the argument over the ultimate meaning
of the Bill of Rights. The effect of reading them as companion volumes
is not to be convinced of the validity of one argument over the other,
but rather to be struck by the importance of the problem-to be
reminded again that the theoretical justification of the very foundation
of our constitutional system is still the subject of sharply drawn con-
troversy.
Judge Hand addresses himself to the "well worn"' problem of the
proper scope of judicial review of legislation in matters relating to the
First, Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. Consid-
ering first the justification of the power of judicial review, Hand finds
nothing in the text of the Constitution itself from which that power
can be inferred.2 From a short survey of the conditions that produced
the Constitution and a briefer analysis of the needs of the government
it created, Hand concludes that the power of judicial review was
reasonably implied by the necessities of our triangular-structured gov-
ernment. Somewhere, he argues, there must reside power to finally
arbitrate boundary disputes between the respective departments, and
it is this function which the Court seemed best suited to fulfill.3
Sharply distinguished from this function, however, is that of question-
1 Hand, The Bill of Rights, 1 (1958).
2 Id. at 10.
3 Id. at 29.
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